The general
surprise that Lebanese civilians are taking the brunt of Israel's onslaught –
and the unwillingness in some quarters of the media to report the fact –
reflects a poor understanding of Israel's historical use of violence. Since its
birth six decades ago, Israel has always been officially "going after the
terrorists," but its actions have invariably harmed civilians in an
indiscriminate manner.
The roll
call of dishonor is long indeed, but its highlights include:
the massacre of some 200 civilians in Tantura,
as well as large-scale massacres in at least a dozen other Palestinian villages,
during the 1948 war that established Israel; Ariel
Sharon's attack on the village of Qibya in 1953
that killed 70 innocent Palestinians; the
Kfar Qassem massacre
inside Israel when 49 farm workers were gunned down at an improvised army
checkpoint; a massacre in the same year in the refugee camp of
Khan Yunis,
in Gaza, in which more than 250 civilians were killed; attacks on dozens of
Palestinian, Egyptian and Syrian villages during the 1967 war; the
killing of six unarmed Arab citizens of Israel in 1976;
the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians in the Lebanese refugee camps
of Sabra
and Shatilla in 1982;
the unremitting use of lethal force by the army against unarmed Palestinians,
often women and children, during the first intifada of 1987-93;
the aerial bombardment of Qana in south Lebanon in 1996
that killed more than 100 civilians; and the endless "collateral damage" of
Palestinian civilians during the second intifada, including a half-ton bomb that
killed a husband and wide and their seven children a week ago.
The true
reasons for these deaths are concealed from credulous observers by Israel's use
of Orwellian language. When it says it is destroying the "infrastructure of
terror," Israel means it is crushing all Arab resistance to its territorial
ambitions in the region. The "infrastructure" includes most Arab men, women and
children because they continue to support – against Israel's wishes – their
peoples' rights to self-determination without interference from the Israeli
army.
In this
sense, and others, there is very little difference between what Israel is doing
in Gaza to overturn the democratic wishes of the Palestinian electorate and what
it is doing in Lebanon to smash any hopes of a democratic future for its
northern neighbor. In Gaza, it wants Hamas destroyed because Hamas is prepared
to counter Israel's unilateral policies with its own unilateral agenda; and in
Lebanon, Israel wants Hezbollah obliterated because it is the only force
capable, possibly, of preventing a repeat of Israel's long invasion and
occupation of the 1980s and 1990s.
By
rounding up the Palestinian cabinet,
Israel is not destroying terror, it is clipping the political wings of Hamas,
those in its leadership who are quickly learning the arts of government and
searching for a space in which they can negotiate with Israel. Through its
rejectionist behavior, Israel is only confirming the doubts of those in the
Hamas military wing who argue Israel always acts in bad faith.
Similarly
in Lebanon, Israel is holding Hezbollah less to account with its attacks than
the Lebanese people and their government, despite the latter's transparently
shaky grip on the country. Israel's military strikes polarize opinion in
Lebanon, weaken Fouad Siniora and his ministers, and threaten to push Lebanon
over the brink into another civil war.
Israel is
keen to talk about "changing the balance of power" in Gaza and Lebanon, implying
that it is trying to strengthen the "democrats" against the "terrorists." But
this impression is entirely false. Israeli actions are destroying what little
balance of power exists in Gaza and Lebanon so that the two areas become
ungovernable.
In Gaza,
Israel has been engineering a debilitating struggle for power between Fatah and
Hamas, while in Lebanon whatever hollow shell of national unity has existed till
now is in danger of cracking under the strain of the Israeli onslaught.
Superficially at least, this seems self-destructive behavior on Israel's part,
given that it has also been striving to detect the fingerprints of outside
actors in Gaza and Lebanon.
In the case
of Gaza, Israel points to Syria as a safe haven for the exiled Hamas leader
Khaled Meshal, to Hezbollah and Iran as sponsors of Hamas "terror" and even to a
new al-Qaeda presence. In the case of Lebanon, Israel additionally identifies
the strong ties between Hezbollah and Damascus and Tehran.
So why
would Israel want Lebanon and Gaza to be ravaged by factional fighting of the
kind that might make them more vulnerable to this kind of unwelcome interference
from outside?
A history
lesson or two helps clarify Israel's reasoning.
In the
occupied Palestinian territories, Hamas was born during the upheavals of the
first intifada and encouraged by Israel as a counterweight to the unifying
secular Palestinian nationalism of Yasser Arafat.
In Lebanon,
the Shi'ite militia Hezbollah was the inevitable byproduct of Israel's
occupation of the south and its establishment of a mostly Christian proxy
militia, the South Lebanon Army, against the Muslim majority.
In both
cases it is clear Israel hoped that, by Islamizing its opponents in these
regional conflicts, it would delegitimize them in the eyes of Western allies and
that it could cultivate sectarianism as a way to further weaken the social
cohesiveness of its neighbors.
Recently
Israel has encouraged the slide deeper into Islamic extremism through its
policies of unilateralism and its refusal to negotiate.
The same
set of policies is being continued now in the Palestinian territories and
Lebanon: the shattering of these two societies will only deepen the trend toward
radical Islam. Islamic movements not only offer the best hope of local
resistance to Israel for these weakened societies but they also offer a parallel
social infrastructure of health care and welfare services as state institutions
collapse.
There is
immediate advantage for Israel in this outcome. With secular society crushed and
Islamic resistance movements filling the void, Israel will be able to reinforce
the impression of many in the West that Israel is on the front line of global
"war of terror" being waged by a single implacable enemy, Islam. Israel's
ability to persuade the world that this war is being waged against the whole
"civilized" Judeo-Christian West will be made that bit easier.
As a
result, Israel may be able to drag its paymaster, the United States, deeper into
the mire of the Middle East as a junior partner rather than as an honest broker,
giving Israel cover while it carves up yet more Palestinian land for annexation,
puts further pressure on the Palestinians to leave their homeland, and
destabilizes its regional enemies so that they are powerless to offer protest or
resistance.
For some
time President Bush has found himself in no position to criticize Israeli
actions when Tel Aviv claims to be doing no more to the Palestinians than the US
is doing to the Iraqis. If the US allows itself to be handcuffed to Israel's
even more extreme version of the "war on terror," the consequences will be dire
not just for the Palestinians or the region, but for all of us.
